Direct (Quoted) Speech Representing an Individual’s Point of View

צָדְקָה מִמֶּנִּי:

She was more righteous than me. (Bereishit 38:26)

The Yesod

The topic with which we have dealt in previous parshiyot, and which will form the basis of our discussion over the following three parshiyot, is the difference — within the kedushah of Torah — between what the Torah itself recounts (which we refer to as “lashon hakatuv” — the words of the pasuk) and what it quotes people as saying (which we call “dibur yashir” — direct or quoted speech). The basis upon which our approach rests is that there is no happenstance in the writing of the Torah, therefore, we need to take note of the difference between what the Torah itself recounts and what it quotes people as saying.

The difficulty that presents itself in this regard is that the words of the Torah are objectively true, while the words of the people it quotes are necessarily subjective in nature. If so, does this not pose a contradiction? Can words be objectively true and subjective at the same time? The answer is that there is no contradiction! Direct speech as quoted in the Torah represents the objective truth regarding the subjective feelings of the person. Let us observe this idea in action as we consider a number of examples from the coming parshiyot of people’s words as quoted by the Torah.

Defining Terms — In Halachah and Machshavah

As we have seen, one of the implications of the nature of direct speech is that Chazal will prefer to quote as a source for the Torah’s definition of a term from the words of the pasuk itself, and not from direct speech. Thus, for example, when seeking to establish that the term “גדי” refers in principle to the kid of any animal, and not specifically that of a goat, the Gemara (Chullin 113b) quotes the pasuk in Bereishit (27:16) which specifies that Rivkah took the skins of “גְּדָיֵי הָעִזִּים — the goat-kids,” implying that had it just used the word “גדי” we would not have known that it was referring to a goat. This idea has halachic ramifications, for when the Torah forbids “גְּדִי בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ — a kid in its mother’s milk,” it refers to all animals, and not just goats. We noted that the Gemara does not bring this proof from earlier on (pasuk 9), when Rivkah tells Yaakov to go and fetch “שְׁנֵי גְּדָיֵי עִזִּים — two goat-kids,” even though, as a rule, Chazal will always quote the earliest pasuk available to serve as a proof. The reason for this is that the earlier pasuk quoted Rivkah’s words (direct speech), whereas the Gemara prefers to adduce a proof from the pasuk’s words (lashon hakatuv).

In a similar vein, Chazal (Masechet Taanit 8a) adduce a proof that there is a concept of “withholding” (“עצירה”) with reference to a woman giving birth from the pasuk (Bereishit 20:18) “כִּי עָצֹר עָצַר ה’ בְּעַד כָּל רֶחֶם לְבֵית אֲבִימֶלֶךְ — for Hashem had closed up every womb in the house of Avimelech,” even though we have an earlier pasuk which demonstrates this idea (ibid. 16:2), “וַתֹּאמֶר שָׂרַי אֶל אַבְרָם הִנֵּה נָא עֲצָרַנִי ה’ מִלֶּדֶת —Sarai said to Avram, ‘Behold Hashem has withheld me from giving birth.’” The reason for this is, again, that Chazal prefer to quote as proofs pesukim which are from the words of the Torah, not from people the Torah is quoting. This is true even though, in this second example, there are no direct halachic ramifications from this definition; nonetheless, the preference is for lashon hakatuv.

Yosef’s Words to his Brothers

This idea may give us a new understanding of the Gemara in Makkot (11a) which discusses the connotation of the term “dibur” in light of the way Yosef spoke to his brothers:

למימרא דכל דיבור לשון קשה? אין. כדכתיב (בראשית מב, ל) "דִּבֶּר הָאִישׁ אֲדֹנֵי הָאָרֶץ אִתָּנוּ קָשׁוֹת".

Is this to say that every usage of the term “dibur” has a harsh connotation? Yes, as it says (Bereishit 42:30), “The man, the lord of the land spoke harshly to us.”

This Gemara seems rather difficult to understand:

1.   What does the Gemara mean by asking if “every usage of the term” has a harsh connotation? If order to answer that question we would need to examine every case where the Torah uses that term!

2.   Why does the Gemara quote this pasuk as its proof, and not from the earlier one (pasuk 7) which describes Yosef talking to his brothers with the words “וַיְדַבֵּר אִתָּם קָשׁוֹת — and he spoke to them harshly”?

3.   This is especially problematic, since the earlier pasuk is the Torah itself speaking, whereas the later pasuk is quoting the brothers! We have seen that the words of the Torah itself make for a stronger proof, yet here the Gemara seems to prefer direct speech!

We would like to suggest that this is exactly the point of the Gemara. When the Gemara asks if it is true that “every usage” of the term “dibur” has a harsh connotation, it means not only this term when used by the pasuk, but even when used by people whom the pasuk is quoting in direct speech. It is for this reason the Gemara brings the proof from the second pasuk, which specifically quotes (even) the brothers as using the word “דיבר” in this way.

Yehudah and Tamar

Coming now to our parshah, in the section dealing with Yehudah and Tamar, when Tamar releases the items Yehudah gave to her as a pledge, the pasuk says (38:26):

וַיַּכֵּר יְהוּדָה וַיֹּאמֶר צָדְקָה מִמֶּנִּי:

Yehudah recognized (them) and said “She is more righteous than me.”

The Seforno explains:

Even though she approached me with deceit…whereas I sent her the goat,[1] nonetheless, she was righteous in her deceit — which was for a good outcome and pleasing to God, as it was for the sake of having children and not for her own pleasure, as we see that she immediately returned to her state of widowhood — (in all this she was righteous) more than I was in keeping my word, where my intention was to preserve my honor and reclaim my pledge, which is a low and worthless goal. And this is as Chazal have said (Nazir 23b) “גדולה עבירה לשמה ממצוה שלא לשמה — an aveirah done for the sake of heaven is greater than a mitzvah done with ulterior motives.”

The concluding words of the Seforno are quite problematic, since the idea that an aveirah lishmah is greater than a mitzvah shelo lishmah is something that the Gemara initially considered, but then concluded is not the case, rather, the two are equal! How is this to be reconciled with the Seforno’s explanation of Yehudah’s words that Tamar was more righteous (aveirah lishmah) than Yehudah (mitzvah shelo lishmah)?

We must conclude that the Seforno’s comments were said in explanation of Yehudah’s words as direct speech. In other words, the Torah is telling us that Yehudah truly felt that Tamar’s deed was more righteous than his own. Now, it is true that Chazal have told us that, post-Matan Torah, the highest level an aveirah lishmah can reach is being equal to a mitzvah shelo lishmah. However, prior to Matan Torah, it is conceivable that there were individuals who were at a level where aveirah lishmah could be higher than a mitzvah shelo lishmah, and perhaps Yehudah felt that Tamar was one of those unique individuals who could achieve that.

Yet while all this is possible, the fact remains that we do not know if Hashem agreed with Yehudah’s assessment, for the Torah does not say “צדקה ממנו — she was more righteous than him.” In this instance, the Torah considers it more important for us to know what Yehudah thought than to know whether or not Hashem concurred with his assessment.

[1] [That is, that I was faithful in keeping my word.]