Shevuos 8:6-Eduyos 1:1

Shevuos 8:6

Let’s say that the owner asks for his ox and the borrower replies, “I have no idea what you’re talking about” when really the ox had died, or was injured, captured, stolen or lost. The owner imposes an oath, to which the borrower replies, “amen.” In such a case, if the borrower later confesses, he is liable to bring an offering. Let’s say that the owner asked a paid watchman or a renter for his ox only to be told that it had died when really it was injured or captured, or he was told that it was injured when it really died or was captured, or he was told that it was captured when it really died or was injured, or he was told that it was stolen when really it was lost, or he was told that it was lost when really it was stolen. In all of these cases, if the owner imposes an oath and the borrower replies “amen,” he is exempt from bringing an offering (because in none of these scenarios does the lie exempt him from a payment he would otherwise owe). If the paid watchman or the renter claimed that the ox died, or was injured or captured when really it was stolen or lost, and the owner imposes an oath to which he replies “amen,” then he is liable to bring an offering (because his lie would exempt him from payments in which he is obligated). If he claimed that it was lost or stolen when really it had died, or was injured or captured, so the owner imposes an oath to which he replies “amen,” he is exempt (because his lie obligated him in payments that he really didn’t owe). The general rule is that if one’s false oath moves his responsibility from financial liability to financial liability, from exemption to exemption, or from exemption to financial liability, he is exempt from bringing an offering. If his false oath took him from financial liability to exemption, then he is liable to bring an offering. The general principle is that if one takes an oath in order to gain an advantage, he is liable, but if it is to his detriment, he is exempt.

Eduyos 1:1

Shammai says that it is sufficient for women to consider themselves ritually unclean from the time they see menstrual blood but Hillel says that a woman must consider herself ritually unclean from the time of her last examination, even if it was many days prior. The Sages disagree with both of these positions, maintaining that a woman is considered to have been ritually unclean for the preceding 24 hours if that’s less than the time since her last examination, or from the time of her last examination if that’s less than 24 hours prior (i.e., she must assume that she has been ritually unclean since the time of her last examination or for the preceding 24 hours, whichever is smaller). If a woman has a regular period, then the time she sees blood is sufficient. If a woman wipes herself with a cloth before and after marital relations, this is the functional equivalent of an examination and it reduces the amount of time she must assume that she was ritually unclean.