Forsaking One’s Legacy

The land may not be sold permanently. For the land is Mine and you are foreigners and residents with Me. (VaYikra 25:23)

Part I:The message of the prohibition [1]

I. The Jubilee and land redistribution

The Torah deals extensively with laws governing the Land of Israel. One of these laws is the mitzvah of Yovel – the Jubilee year. The Yovel is observed through a variety of practices. These include not working the land, freeing all Jewish slaves, and restoration of the land to its rightful owners. This last practice is discussed in our passage. To understand this aspect of the Jubilee year, an introduction is needed.

The Torah explains that once the Land of Israel is conquered, it is to be divided among the shevatim – the tribes. Then, the shevatim are to divide the land among their member families. Finally, the land is to be distributed to the various qualified members of each family. As subsequent generations inherit the land, it is further divided among the heirs. At any time during this process, the owner may sell the land to a person from another family, or from another shevet. However, at the Yovel the land returns to the seller or his heirs. Consequently, it returns also to the tribe and family to which it was initially distributed. 

Through this system an equitable distribution of the land throughout the nation is re-established every fifty years. Our pasuk tells us that we may not undermine this process by selling the land on a permanent basis. In the context of this commandment, a sale is deemed to be “permanent” if it is intended to transfer the land to the purchaser for a period extending beyond the Yovel. Even if the terms of the sale require the purchaser to return the land to the seller at some point in time after the Yovel, the sale is deemed “permanent.”

What is the reason for this restriction? Our pasuk addresses this issue. It states that the land is Hashem’s and the people are only foreigners or residents. What exactly is the intent of this statement? What is this pasuk telling us about Yovel?

II. Whose land is it?

The commentaries differ on this issue. Rashi seems to indicate that the message is very simple. The land is Hashem’s. It is not ours. To impress this idea upon us, our use and sovereignty over the land is restricted. Through restricting farming of the land and its sale, the Torah demonstrates that the land is really Hashem’s.[2] 

III. The Land of Israel is special

Rabbaynu Ovadia Sforno offers a similar explanation. Hashem told Adam that he should conquer the Earth.[3] Sforno explains that Hashem gave humanity the right to rule over the Earth. We have the authority to use the land and other natural resources for the benefit of humanity. We are relatively unrestricted in our authority. However, our authority does not extend to the Land of Israel. Our right to rule over the Land of Israel is restricted.[4] Apparently, this is because the Land of Israel has a specific designation. It is designated as a place for the development of a Torah society. This must be the primary function of the land. To reinforce this message – that we do not have complete sovereignty over the Land of Israel and that we must respect its designation – our ownership is restricted. We may not sell the land on a permanent basis.

IV. Too much wealth

Rabbaynu Avraham ibn Ezra offers a completely different explanation of the restriction on selling the land permanently. He explains that the restriction reminds us of our own mortality.[5] How is this accomplished? Apparently, Ibn Ezra maintains that the accumulation of vast wealth and enormous estates is associated with a fantasy of immortality. A person who recognizes the finite nature of our time in this world does not indulge in such extravagant ventures. The person who is fully in touch with one’s mortality provides for his finite life in this world but does not attempt to amass fortunes that he can never enjoy or use. The restriction in our passage prevents the accumulation of land in permanent large estates and discourages fantasies of immortality.

Part II: The structure of the prohibition

I. Who is addressed by the prohibition?

Let us consider another issue regarding our passage. Assume a seller enters into an agreement to permanently sell his land. Is this agreement binding? The answer is that the sale does not permanently convey the land to the buyer. At Yovel, the land reverts to the seller.[6] However, our passage is not merely telling us that the land cannot be permanently conveyed. The pasuk is stating a commandment. According to Rashi, this commandment is directed toward the buyer. The purchaser cannot retain the land. The land must be returned at Yovel.[7] 

Ramban – Nachmanides – disagrees with Rashi. He observes that the passage states that the land should not be permanently sold. This seems to address the seller. According to Rashi, the passage is addressing the purchaser. If so, the pasuk should state that the land should not be permanently purchased.

Based on this analysis, Ramban concludes that the passage certainly addresses the seller, and perhaps, the buyer is also included in the prohibition. In other words, the passage definitely prohibits the seller from entering into an agreement to permanently convey the land. Ramban acknowledges that possibly the buyer is also included in the prohibition.[8]

II. The roles of seller and buyer

It seems that Ramban is raising a valid objection to Rashi’s interpretation of the pasuk. If the mitzvah in the pasuk is directed to the buyer, why is it expressed as a prohibition against a permanent sale? It should be stated as a prohibition against a permanent purchase.

To explain Rashi’s position we must understand a basic concept. To permanently convey land, two things are necessary. First, the parameters of the sell must be defined. This is done by the seller. The seller owns the land and decides the terms of the sale. Therefore, for the land to be permanently transferred to the buyer, the seller must decide that this will be the term of the sale. Second, the buyer must retain the land beyond Yovel. The buyer has the option to ignore the terms of the sale and restore the land to its appropriate owner at the Yovel.  By electing not to do so, and instead retaining the land, the purchaser affects a permanent conveyance. In short, the decision to make the land available for permanent sale is made by the seller. However, the permanent conveyance of the land can only be affected by the purchaser retaining the land beyond the Yovel year. 

Rashi maintains that the permanent sale or conveyance of the land is prohibited. However, he argues that the mitzvah does not prohibit merely making such an agreement; it prohibits the actual effect of permanent conveyance. The buyer assures this outcome. The effect takes place when the buyer decides he will not restore the land at Yovel. Therefore, Rashi reasons that the prohibition is directed against the purchaser.

There is still a difficulty with Rashi. We can understand the reason the Torah addresses this commandment to the purchaser. However, the wording of the passage remains difficult to explain. According to Rashi, the pasuk should explicitly address the buyer. The passage should say that the land may not be permanently bought. 

III. Alternative meanings

Chizkuni offers a brilliant answer to this question. It is important to remember that our problem is based on the assumption that the passage refers to the sale of the land and not its purchase. Chizkuni explains that the Hebrew word in the pasuk for the transfer of the land is mecher. This term is generally translated as “sell”. However, mecher is related to the term karait or keritut. These words mean to “permanently cut-off”.[9] Based on this analysis we can better interpret the intent of the passage. An exact interpretation is that the land may not be permanently cut-off from the seller. The term mecher is used because it expresses the concept of complete and absolute conveyance. This effect is produced by the actions of the purchaser.

IV. Contradicting the Torah

We can now easily understand Ramban’s position. He contends that the passage clearly addresses the seller. Why does Ramban insist the seller is the primary party in the violation of this mitzvah? Apparently, Ramban does not agree with Rashi’s basic premise. Rashi contends that the mitzvah prohibits the effectuation of the permanent conveyance. Ramban asserts that the mitzvah prohibits creating or designing a sale that contradicts the designation of the land. The land is designated to return to its owner. The seller defines the parameters of the sale and once he defines these parameters as a permanent sale, the land’s designation is undermined. The purchaser is not included in this prohibition. This is because the buyer does not define the parameters of the sale.

Ramban acknowledges that the mitzvah may include both the seller and buyer. In fact, this is Rambam’s – Maimonides’ – position.[10] This is the simplest formulation of the mitzvah. According to Rambam, the agreement is prohibited; two parties are needed to create an agreement. A seller and purchaser are required. Therefore, both parties are included in the mitzvah. In a permanent sale of the land, both violate the mitzvah.

[1]  This material originally appeared in Thought on the Parasha 5768 as “The Prohibition against Permanent Sale of One’s Legacy in the Land of Israel”. It is reprinted with minor revisions.

[2]  Rabbaynu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer VaYikra 25:23.

[3]  Sefer Beresheit 1:28.

[4]  Rabbaynu Ovadia Sforno, Commentary on Sefer VaYikra 25:23.

[5]  Rabbaynu Avraham ibn Ezra, Commentary on Sefer VaYikra 25:23.

[6]  Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Mishne Torah, Hilchot Shemitah Ve’Yovel 11:1.

[7]  Rabbaynu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer VaYikra 25:23.

[8]  Rabbaynu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer VaYikra 25:23.

[9]  Rabbaynu Chizkiya ben Manoach (Chizkuni), Commentary on Sefer Vakikra, 25:23.

[10]  Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Mishne Torah, Hilchot Shemitah VeYovel 11:1.