What is the Halacha in Cases of Disputes Over a Worker’s Wages?

Provided courtesy of Real Clear Daf

We learned about this on the “home stretch” of Shevuos this week (46a). While our Mishnah clearly establishes the halacha where the worker claims he wasn’t paid (he swears and collects), the Gemara wonders what the halacha would be if they were instead fighting about how much the employer had agreed to pay the worker for the job. The students of Rav’s yeshiva asked Shmuel about this who answered this in this case the employer would swear to his claim and thereby be exempt from paying the larger amount. What’s the difference? Shmuel reasons that the Rabbis only allowed the worker to swear and collect where the claim is he wasn’t paid at all since it is not uncommon for employers to lose track of which workers they did or did not pay. But employers generally will not forget the amount he agreed to pay his worker. As such the employer retains his right in this case to swear.

The Gemara seeks to refute Shmuel’s ruling from a Braissa which clearly states that even by a dispute of the amount of wages, we allow the worker to swear. Shmuel deflects this by asserting that the Braissa in question is in accordance with the minority view of R’ Yehudah. The majority opinion of the Rabbanan though would side with Shmuel that the employer would swear. The Gemara retorts that if Shmuel is referring to R’ Yehudah of the Mishnah, if anything, this would make matters worse for Shmuel. For in the Mishnah we find that R’ Yehuda actually gives more power to the employer, not the worker, in terms of his right to swear and win the case: R’ Yehudah rules there that if we are not discussing a situation of a Biblical oath, i.e. where the employer partially admitted to the worker’s claim, then we would not allow the worker to swear. So if we find that R’ Yehudah is more strict on the question of a worker’s oath rights, why should we believe Shmuel’s claim that R’ Yehudah is the Tanna behind the lenient ruling allowing the worker to swear when they dispute the amount of wages?

However the Gemara goes on to prove from a Braissa that R’ Yehudah in fact says that where the dispute is about the amount of wages, we allow the worker to swear, giving credence to Shmuel’s defense that only R’ Yehudah says this, not the majority opinion of the Rabbanan. Having proved that these differing views exist the Gemara then seeks to explain how it all makes sense. For as the Gemara had pointed out earlier: how does it make sense for R’ Yehudah who has a record of being stringent on the worker’s oath rights to suddenly be lenient on his oath rights where he wants to swear about the amount of stipulated wages?

This is how the Gemara ties it all together. What is the underlying view that explains R’ Yehudah’s stringent stance in our Mishnah? It is not simply that he’s “more stringent” on the worker. Rather R’ Yehudah disputes the notion of allowing the worker to swear (where the employer denies owing anything) on technical grounds: the obligation to swear in this case is altogether only Rabbinic in nature. To have the plaintiff swear and collect would be an additional Rabbinic innovation, and in general the Rabbis do not impose enactments on top of their own enactments. That’s the reason why R’ Yehudah only grants the worker the right to swear if a Biblical oath had been generated, for instance if the employer had admitted to part of the claim. The point is that once the technicality of dealing with a Rabbinic oath is out of the way, R’ Yehudah fully endorses the approach of having the worker swear and hence his ruling by the “amount of wages” dispute in favor of the worker (provided that a Biblical oath was generated) is perfectly consistent with this approach.

The Rabbanan however are not concerned with R’ Yehudah’s technicality of a double Rabbinic enactment and therefore allow the worker to swear even when we’re purely dealing with a Rabbinic oath. On the other hand the Rabbanan side with Shmuel in the case where the dispute is about the amount of wages that here we rule in favour of the employer since we assume that on this question his memory is reliable and that the Rabbis therefore saw no reason to shift the oath power from him to the worker.

Mazel Tov upon the completion of masechtas Shevuos: we will return to you masechtas Shevuos!