Ritual Slaughter of a “Wayward City” Animal: Does It Do Anything?

Provided courtesy of Real Clear Daf

On Sanhedrin 112a, Rav Chisda discussed this fascinating question. The Torah condemns the property of an עיר הנדחת, a whole city that strayed into idol worship: virtually all its property is destroyed in fire and the people and animals of the city are slain by the sword. But what would be the law, Rav Chisda wonders, if a kosher animal from the עיר הנדחת was not executed along with the other inhabitants, and instead someone slaughtered this animal adhering to all the legal requirements of proper ritual slaughter? What would be the animal’s status?

Rav Chisda makes it clear that he is not entertaining that the slaughtered animal would be kosher to eat. For properly slaughtering the animal will not change the fact that it is an עיר הנדחת animal which means that it is permanently forbidden for any benefit. This עיר הנדחת problem is not addressed by a proper ritual slaughter. Rather Rav Chisda entertains that by slaughtering this animal properly, its carcass will not convey ritual impurity to someone who comes into contact with it. In other words, a proper act of ritual slaughter normally accomplishes two things: 1) it makes the animal kosher to eat, and 2) it classifies the animal as a “properly slaughtered animal” as opposed to a ritual-impurity-generating “carcass.” One could argue that although this act of slaughter will never render this animal kosher to eat, we should still recognize it as an act of slaughter which prevents it from receiving the “carcass” label that would make it a source of ritual impurity. The counterargument to this is that since there is a legal obligation upon this animal to slay it “by the sword,” perhaps we should automatically regard this act of killing the animal with a sharp edge as an act of “execution” rather than ritual slaughter. Accordingly, the dead animal would generate ritual impurity. The Gemara leaves this question unresolved.

What do Eidim Zomemim pay if they testified falsely that a man owes his wife her kesuba?

First of all: mazel tov on completing Sanhedrin and on beginning masechtas Makkos!

The first chapter of Makkos deals with the laws of Eidim Zomemim (henceforth, E”Z), conspiring witnesses who sought to subject their victim to a court punishment through false testimony. The Torah says that if their plot was foiled based on new witnesses who testify (addressing the false witnesses), “you were with us somewhere else at the time that you claim to have seen that crime!” then the earlier witnesses are deemed E”Z, and they receive the very punishment they sought to impose on their intended victim.

Normally, carrying out the law of E”Z is a relatively simple matter: if they were trying to subject their victim to lashes then they get lashes. If they were trying to make their victim liable to pay money he didn’t owe, then they would have to pay that sum to the victim. The Mishnah on 3a deals with a less simple case: what if the E”Z falsely testified that a man divorced his wife and didn’t pay her the kesuba? Here, the Mishnah points out, it wouldn’t be fair to make the E”Z pay the entire kesuba amount since, in the event that the husband would eventually either predecease or divorce his wife, he anyways would have had to pay this kesuba amount to his wife. The question therefore becomes how to properly gauge the actual loss that these E”Z would have caused this person through their false testimony.

The Mishnah is somewhat vague on how we make the assessment and the Gemara presents two interpretations. Rav Chisda asserts that we make a simple calculation: the amount the husband could receive if he were to liquidate his interest in the kesuba today. As Rashi explains, the husband would receive more if he were to sell than the wife would. For even though buying either spouse out carries the significant risk that the other spouse will live longer and retain the kesuba money (which typically includes properties that were brought into the marriage and designated for the kesuba), the husband’s interest has the added value in that he has practical ownership of the kesuba properties throughout the marriage (so buying the husband out means definitely receiving something of value for a period of time). So the E”Z simply pay the husband the market value of the husband’s interest in the kesuba.

Rav Nosson bar Oshaya asserts a different calculation: the E”Z pay the husband the entire kesuba amount--minus the value of the wife’s interest in the kesuba. Since, as explained above, the wife’s interest is worth less than the husband’s, this calculation will mean the E”Z pay a greater percentage of the kesuba. Rashi explains the logic of this approach: the husband would happily pay a small sum (the market value of her portion) to buy her out and guarantee a permanent claim to the kesuba property, therefore, subtracting this sum represent the amount of loss the E”Z would have caused.

One could question Rav Nosson’s explanation: how is the husband’s willingness to buy her out an accurate way to assess the what the E”Z tried to take away? Seemingly the only accurate way to gauge what the E”Z truly sought to deprive the husband of is by simply asking: how much can the husband sell his portion today for (Rav Chisda’s approach)?

Perhaps this is Rav Nosson’s reasoning: really the husband has a right to object to the basic premise of this discussion that we consider the future possibility that he might anyways have to pay this kesuba. That is, the husband should be able to respond, “why is that relevant?” For the fact is, today the husband is in sole possession of the kesuba property. The mere possibility that that status might change in the future shouldn’t lead us to revise the assessment that the E”Z tried to steal the entire kesuba amount from the husband through their false testimony! Rav Nosson’s approach partially acknowledges the validity of the husband’s argument, though it also gives some weight to the “maybe he would have paid anyways” consideration. The “compromise” here is that we take the current value of that future possibility (i.e. her share) and subtract it from the total kesuba amount.

Next time someone tells you that Makkos is a nice easy little masechta, learn this daf with him and prove to him otherwise.