The Disgraced Rabbi - part 2
Studying a Disgraced Scholar’s Works
Until now, we have discussed the question of learning directly from a disgraced rabbi. We will now turn our attention to the question of whether one may access his materials, such as his books or recordings.
As mentioned earlier, the requirement to study only from an “angelic” rabbi is inferred from the verse in in Sefer Malachi (2:7), “they shall seek Torah from his mouth, because he is an angel of the Lord of Hosts.” Rav Yirmiyahu Löw, in his Divrei Yirmiyahu commentary to the Rambam’s Mishneh Torah (Hilchos Talmud Torah), boldly asserted (citing his father) that this halacha refers only to studying Torah from the “mouth” of a wayward scholar, meaning, through direct communication, as opposed to through the written word. Direct study from an evildoer exposes the student to the teacher’s sinful qualities and conduct, which could negatively impact the student. However, Rav Löw posits, when one reads the writings of a wayward scholar, he can access the valuable wisdom and knowledge from the material without exposing himself to the author’s sinful character. As such, there is no prohibition against reading material authored by a sinful scholar.[1] On this basis, Rav Löw sought to reconcile this halacha with the fact that the Rambam studied the works of non-Jewish scholars.
This was also the view of Rav Yosef Zecharya Stern, in a letter[2] defending his occasional citation of Moses Mendelsohn’s works, in which he approvingly mentions the aforementioned passage from Divrei Yirmiyahu.
It stands to reason that the exception made by Rav Löw for written material would apply to recordings, as well. Rav Löw explains the prohibition as based on the negative influence that would result from the relationship between the student and the wayward teacher: שחיבור עם רשע רע וגורם רעה והשחתה לאדם – “for the connection with an evil person is bad and causes a person harm and [spiritual] destruction.” One who listens to or views a recording of a rabbi’s lecture does not, seemingly, forge the kind of חיבור (“connection”) that could yield a deleterious spiritual effect. As such, Rav Löw would likely permit using recorded material of a sinful teacher.
Regardless, other poskim dispute this position. Rav Shmuel Wosner (Shevet Ha’levi, 3:145) writes explicitly that one may not read the works of a wayward scholar:
כמו דאז"ל דאסור ללמוד תורה מרב שאינו הגון כך אסור ללמוד תורה שנכתב או נדפס ממי שאינו הגון, שבלי ספק פוגם.
Just as the Sages said that it is forbidden to study Torah from a wayward rabbi, it is likewise forbidden to study Torah that was written or printed by somebody who is wayward, as this undoubtedly causes harm.
In Rav Wosner’s view, reading material written by a sinner – and even material authored by an upstanding scholar, but printed by a sinner – can cause a person harm, and is thus forbidden. This is also the ruling of Rav Avraham Yaffe Shlesinger, in Be’er Sarim (likutim, 39:3).[3]
We should add that according to the comments of the Saba of Kelm cited earlier, that the Torah taught by an evildoer cannot actually be considered “Torah,” there is certainly no reason to distinguish between direct contact and studying from an evildoer’s written or recorded materials.[4]
Thus, different views exist as to whether one may study from written or recorded Torah materials produced by a sinner.
Studying Torah Produced Before the Scholar’s Misconduct
If, indeed, this prohibition includes studying from a disgraced scholar’s printed or recorded material, the question becomes whether this applies even to material produced before the scholar turned sinful. Does this material become illegitimate once the author or speaker sins, or does it retain its validity despite his subsequent fall into the abyss of sinful conduct?
The answer to this question appears to emerge from a responsum of Rav Moshe Feinstein (Iggeros Moshe, E.H. 1:96) concerning the case of a composer of popular religious songs who became known as a sinner.[5] The question arose whether it was permissible to sing the songs he composed while he was still reputed to be a God-fearing, upstanding Jew, and, if so, whether it was permissible to also sing the songs composed after he was determined to act sinfully. Rav Moshe ruled that singing any of this musician’s songs is permissible, for several reasons, some of which are relevant also to the case of a wayward Torah scholar.
The basis for considering forbidding the use of these songs, Rav Moshe writes, is the Rambam’s ruling (Hilchos Yesodei Ha’Torah 6:8) that a Sefer Torah written by a heretic should be burned, כדי שלא להניח שם למינים ולא למעשיהם – “in order not to make a name for the heretics or their deeds.” One might have thought to extend this halacha and forbid making use of anything produced by a sinner, as one thereby publicizes him and his work. Rav Moshe dismisses this conclusion, noting that, for one thing, the Rambam’s ruling applies only to Torah scrolls written after the person became a heretic; there is no indication that a Sefer Torah written by a pious scribe is rendered invalid once he becomes a heretic.[6] Secondly, Rav Moshe asserts that the rule of שלא להניח שם applies only to heretics, those who deny the basic tenets of Jewish faith. It does not apply to those who are believers but act inappropriately, such as the composer in question. Therefore, Rav Moshe writes, as long as there is no indication that this composer embraced heresy, his songs may be sung without any concern.[7]
Both these arguments directly apply to the case of a disgraced scholar. Even though halacha forbids studying from such a rabbi after he has been determined to be sinful, the material he produced before then is permissible for use, particularly if there is no indication of heresy, such as cases of rabbis who succumbed to greed, lust and other vices.
Learning From a Disgraced Rabbi Who Repents
In conclusion, let us turn our attention to the situation of a disgraced rabbi who appears to sincerely regret his misconduct and to have undergone a process of genuine teshuva. The Rambam and Shulchan Aruch forbid learning from a wayward rabbi עד שובו למוטב – “until he returns to proper conduct.”[8] Significantly, halacha does not require distancing oneself from a disgraced scholar forever; it takes into account the possibility of teshuva, the opportunity given to all sinners to repent and regain their good standing before God and before their peers.
The question, however, becomes, how do we determine that the rabbi has repented? In many cases, the rabbi had successfully projected an image of genuine piety even as he committed the most unspeakable crimes. A rabbi who was initially able to convince nearly everybody of his spiritual greatness as he perpetrated grave religious and ethical wrongs is likewise capable after he is caught of convincing the public that he has since repented. What measures are required to trust that such a rabbi has truly “returned to proper conduct” such that he may once again be turned to as a source of Torah scholarship and guidance?
The poskim discuss the issue of verifying a sinner’s teshuva with regard to eligibility for eidus (giving testimony). Halacha disqualifies various categories of sinners for eidus, but allows these sinners to regain their eligibility through repentance. The case of a disgraced rabbi most likely resembles that of a מומר – a person who is known to be a habitual and unabashed sinner. Regarding such a person, the Rama (C.M. 34:22) writes, citing the Maharik:
מומר שחזר בו וקיבל עליו תשובה כשר מיד אע"פ שלא עשאה עדיין.
A מומר who had a change of heart and took it upon himself to repent is eligible immediately, even though he did not yet perform [repentance].
According to the Maharik, the moment a מומר affirms his commitment to repent, he regains his eligibility to testify, even before he actually takes concrete measures of teshuva. The Maharik draws proof to his view from the Gemara’s ruling in Maseches Gittin (35b) concerning a kohen who marries a woman whom he is forbidden to marry, such as a divorcee. The Gemara rules that although such a kohen may not perform the avoda in the Beis Ha’mikdash, he regains his eligibility to perform the avoda the moment he vows to divorce the woman, even before he actually grants the divorce. Just as a verbal commitment of repentance suffices to allow this kohen to again perform the avoda, similarly, the Maharik maintains that a habitual sinner’s verbal commitment to repent suffices for him to regain his eligibility to testify.
However, the scope of this halacha is subject to debate among the Acharonim. The Shach asserts that this rule may be applied broadly, to all cases of habitual sinners. Once they verbally commit to repent, they regain their eligibility. Rav Yehonasan Eibshitz, however, in Tumim (34:21), disagrees. In his view, in order for a sinner to regain his eligibility, we require דבר מוכיח וניכר לכל שחזר – “something that proves and makes it clear to all that he has repented.” In the case of the מומר discussed by the Maharik, the very fact that he withdrew from the non-Jewish crowd with whom he had been associating suffices as proof of his sincere resolve to change, and thus he regains his eligibility even before we see him follow up on his commitment. For this same reason, Rav Eibshitz explains, a kohen who had marred a divorcee must formally vow to divorce her before regaining his eligibility, and a mere proclamation does not suffice. Only a formal vow provides the clear evidence that is needed for a sinner to demonstrate his resolve to repent.
One may, at first glance, draw proof to the Tumim’s view from the Shulchan Aruch’s later ruling (34:30-31) concerning מפריחי יונים – people who train birds to capture other birds – and משחקי בקוביא – gamblers. Such people are disqualified for eidus, as the Shulchan Aruch states earlier (34:16), because these activities either resemble, or generally entail, theft, and they remain disqualified even after they repent until they disassemble the tools used for these undignified activities. This requirement would seem to prove that, as the Tumim claimed, a verbal commitment to change does not suffice, and that we demand a דבר מוכיח וניכר לכל – some clear indication of a genuine change of heart.
This point was noted by the Nesivos (Bi’urim, 34:13), who follows the Shach’s lenient ruling that it suffices for a sinner to avow his commitment to repent. In defense of this position, the Nesivos writes that an exception is made forעבירה דחימוד ממון – sins involving material lust, such as gambling. Habitual sinners of this kind are especially prone to recidivism, and thus a mere declaration of a desire to change is insufficient to affirm repentance and restore their status of presumed eligibility.
Although Rav Eibshitz applies this notion to the specific exception of חימוד ממון, we might wonder whether it may apply to other categories of sin, as well. Withdrawing from habitual sexual indiscretion, including child molestation, would seem to be no less difficult than withdrawing from habitual financial misdemeanors. Logically, and in consideration of human nature, we have no more reason to rely upon a verbal proclamation of repentance in the case of a sexual offender than in the case of a gambler. Possibly, then, even the Shach and Nesivos would concede than when dealing with a rabbi found guilty of frequent sexual misconduct, a mere declaration of a change of heart would be insufficient, and a more compelling demonstration of teshuva would be required before he could be allowed to resume teaching Torah.
It emerges, then, that according to Rav Yehonasan Eibshitz, a sinner does not regain his presumed status of eligibility until he has demonstratively repented and made it clear that he has firmly resolved to never repeat his offenses. According to the Shach, even a verbal declaration of teshuva suffices, though, when it comes to certain types of sin, even the Shach might concede that the sinner must prove that he has repented.[9]
Reinstatement to a Rabbinic or Educational Post
While it is clear that a rabbi who sinned may resume teaching Torah after repenting – notwithstanding the practical question of how to ascertain the sincerity of his teshuva – it is questionable whether he may return to his previous formal rabbinic position, even after demonstrable repentance. The basis for this distinction is the contrast between the Rambam’s aforementioned ruling, allowing studying from a wayward rabbi once he “returns to proper conduct,” and his ruling elsewhere, in Hilchos Sanhedrin (17:9): אבל ראש הישיבה שחטא מלקין אותו ואינו חוזר לשררותו. The Rambam here establishes that a ראש הישיבה who sins may not be reinstated to his prior post, even after enduring court-administered corporal punishment. No mention is made of the possibility of his reinstatement after repenting, implying that even though, as the Rambam indicates in Hilchos Talmud Torah, a wayward rabbi may resume teaching Torah once he repents, a ראש הישיבה may not return to his position even after performing teshuva.
The question then becomes to whom exactly the Rambam refers in this halacha, and to which kind of rabbinic posts this rule applies.
Both the Kessef Mishneh and the Radbaz, in their respective commentaries to Hilchos Sanhedrin, explain that the Rambam refers here to the post of נשיא – the head of the Sanhedrin. The Rambam’s ruling, according to these commentators, is drawn from the Talmud Yerushalmi, which, in Maseches Horiyos (3:1), establishes that a נשיא who commits a sin is not reinstated to his post.
If so, then we must address the question of why a נשיא may not return to his position after repenting, and whether this halacha may be applicable to other positions of Torah education and leadership.[10]
The Kessef Mishneh and Radbaz explain that a נשיא may not return to his position of leadership because he may seek revenge against the court that had sentenced him to corporal punishment.[11] According to this explanation, this halacha is very limited in scope, and applies only to positions of authority which may be abused for the sake of revenge. In virtually all cases of a disgraced rabbi, then, he may return to his prior position after repenting.
However, the Kessef Mishneh then adds a second explanation, namely, that even after repenting, the disgraced נשיא cannot ever earn the respect and esteem that the position deserves, and for this reason he is not reinstated. It is unclear, according to this approach, whether this concern for respect is relevant specifically when dealing with the lofty position of head of the Sanhedrin, or to any distinguished rabbinic post. Hence, no definitive conclusion can be reached on the basis of this comment of the Kessef Mishneh.
The Radbaz, in one of his responsa (6:2078), advances a different explanation of the Rambam’s ruling. He writes:
מפני שכל חטאות הנשיא חשבינן להו כאילו עבר בפרהסיא, ואיכא חילול השם טובא.
…because all the sins of a נשיא are considered as though they were committed publicly, and there is thus an especially grave defamation of God’s Name.
Generally, when a person serving in a religious post sins privately, the matter can be resolved in a discreet fashion, by privately meeting with the rabbi to reprimand him, quietly imposing whatever punitive measures are appropriate, and ensuring that he has sincerely repented and is committed to never repeating the sinful act. Hence, the Radbaz writes, such a person, in most cases, should not be demoted. The Rambam makes an exception in the case of a נשיא, however, because even his private misdeeds are considered public, due to the uniquely prominent stature of his position. Therefore, reinstating a נשיא who committed a private offense is akin to reinstating a person who had filled a different public religious role and publicly sinned. His reinstatement would create a grave חילול ה', and is thus forbidden. [12]
According to the Radbaz, it would seem, the yardstick by which we determine whether a disgraced rabbi may resume his position after repentance is חילול ה'. If his crime became public, such that his reinstatement would bring dishonor to Torah and the rabbinate, as the public associates him with the sin he had committed, then he may never return to his post, even after sincere teshuva. If so, then the Radbaz’s approach may yield important ramifications for most modern-day rabbinic scandals, which, due to the swift flow of information and news, enter the public sphere very quickly. Any serious offense of which a rabbi is found guilty in our day and age ipso facto becomes an עבירה בפרהסיא – a public offense – and therefore, according to the Radbaz, it should perhaps be equated with the case of a sin committed by a נשיא, and render the perpetrator permanently disqualified for a rabbinic post.[13]
Rav Moshe Feinstein, in Dibberos Moshe (Gittin, vol. 1, p. 355), explains the Rambam’s ruling much differently, claiming that the term ראש הישיבה in this context refers to one who teaches advanced Torah scholars. A person who fills such a post and is found to have sinned may not return to his position even after repentance, and he is deemed forever unsuitable for this lofty role. According to Rav Moshe, then, ordinary rabbis and teachers may resume their posts after repenting, but those who teach advanced talmidei chachamim become permanently disqualified for this job once they have been disgraced. [14]
Thus, although a disgraced rabbi may once again teach Torah once he had demonstrably repented and mended his ways, he might still be disqualified for a formal post, if this would create a חילול ה' (Radbaz) or if he teaches advanced students (Rav Moshe Feinstein).
Conclusion
In light of what we have seen, the following guidelines apply when a rabbi or educator is alleged to have engaged in inappropriate conduct:
- One must not reach any definitive conclusions based on hearsay, and judgment must be reserved until rumors of misconduct have been substantiated.
- If it is confirmed that the rabbi in question engaged in behavior that brings shame to Torah, one may not learn Torah from him.
- It is questionable whether one may read a sinful rabbi’s written works or use his recorded material.
- Written or recorded material that the rabbi produced before he became a sinner may be used.
- If a disgraced rabbi has sincerely repented, he may once again teach Torah, though it would appear that according to some views, there must be compelling evidence of true, genuine teshuva.
- At least according to some opinions, even after a disgraced rabbi has genuinely and demonstrably repented, he may not resume his official rabbinic post or educational position if his reinstatement will create a חילול ה', or if the position is an especially distinguished post, such as in the case of a Rosh Yeshiva.
[1] It should also be noted that when the Gemara initially questioned the legitimacy of Rabbi Meir’s studying under Elisha ben Avuya, it asked, ורבי מאיר היכא למד מפומא דאחר – “How did Rabbi Meir learn from the mouth of Acher,” perhaps suggesting that the prohibition relates specifically to study through direct, verbal communication.
[2] The letter was written to Rav Chaim Chizkiya Medini (author of Sdei Chemed), and appears in Pakuos Sadeh, a booklet published by Rav Medini in Jerusalem, in 1900, and in Sdei Chemed (Ma’areches Alef, p. 188).
[3] See also Rav Menachem Giat, Toras Chacham, vol. 1, p. 371.
[4] The Gemara in Maseches Sanhedrin (106b) tells that God acceded to David’s request that the words of Torah taught by Doeg and Achisofel – two Torah scholars who became evil and betrayed David – should not be shared in study halls. This would seem to indicate that the Torah taught by a wayward scholar should not even be cited, let alone read and studied. In truth, however, it is likely that this measure was taken as a special penalty against Doeg and Achisofel for their especially grievous crimes. Indeed, the Gemara tells that God initially thought that their words of Torah should be shared among scholars, until David requested that they should never be cited. It thus appears that this was an extraordinary provision that cannot necessarily be applied in cases of other sinners. Moreover, the Maharal, in Nesivos Olam (Nesiv Ha’Torah, chapter 8), cites this comment of the Gemara as proof that one should not study Torah that was taught by a heretic. As such, this comment does not necessarily indicate that one must avoid the Torah of other sinners, who do not hold heretical beliefs.
[5] Rav Moshe writes that this musician “brings unmarried men and unmarried women together and plays before them.” Presumably, this responsum, which was written in 1959, refers to Shlomo Carlebach.
[6] Rav Moshe cites as his source the Pischei Teshuva, Y.D. 281:2.
Interestingly, Rav Yaakov Sasportas (1610-1698), one of the first outspoken opponents of Shabtai Tzvi, writes in his Ohalei Yaakov (68) that communities should not adopt the practice championed by Shabtai Tzvi to recite birkas kohanim every day, despite the sound halachic basis for this practice, in order that this evil person would not receive credit for a worthwhile practice. He cites as his source the Rambam’s remark in Hilchos Ma’aser (9:1) identifying Yochanan Kohen Gadol, who is credited with instituting the requirement to tithe produce purchased from an עם הארץ (“ignoramus”), as the high priest who succeeded Simon the Just. The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam made this comment to clarify that he does not refer to the other Yochanan Kohen Gadol, who lived later and who became a heretic at the end of his life. Rav Sasportas understood that if this had been the later Yochanan Kohen Gadol, the Sages would not have memorialized his enactment, since he subsequently became a heretic. (Rav Moshe also cites the Rambam’s comment, and explains it differently.) This would appear to suggest that according to Rav Sasportas, if a rabbi becomes a heretic, it is forbidden to cite even the scholarship he produced while he was still a scholar in good standing, in contradistinction to Rav Moshe’s ruling.
[7] Rav Moshe also contends that the law of שלא להניח שם applies only to matters of sanctity, such as a Sefer Torah, but not to other products, such as music.
[8] The Shulchan Aruch’s formulation is עד שיחזור למוטב.
[9] See also the comments of Rav Mordechai Willig, cited in the transcription of an interview he gave, where he states that a disgraced rabbi may not be allowed to resume teaching Torah until he undergoes the process of teshuva outlined by the Rambam in the second chapter of Hilchos Teshuva.
[10] For a thorough presentation of the various sources relevant to the Rambam’s ruling, see Professor Nachum Rakover’s article, “Oved Tzibur She’sarach Ve’ritza Es Onsho,” at http://www.daat.ac.il/mishpat-ivri/skirot/180-2.htm.
[11] This explanation is based on the aforementioned passage in the Yerushalmi, which states that a נשיא who sinned is not reinstated because מוטב דינון מחזירין ליה דו קטלון ליה, which the Kessef Mishneh understood to mean that the reinstated נשיא may seek to kill those who had demoted him.
[12] The Radbaz offered this explanation to reconcile the Rambam’s ruling here in Hilchos Sanhedrin with his comments the responsum noted earlier, stating that no holder of a religious post is demoted after committing a sin, as long as the sin was committed privately.
[13] Conceivably, however, if the prohibition against reinstatement stems from the consideration of חילול ה', then at least in principle, if the rabbi’s sincere repentance is also done publicly, and he succeeds in projecting a public image of genuine penitence, then perhaps he should be allowed to return to his prior position. This point was made by Profess Rakover (above, note 18).
[14] Curiously, Rav Moshe cites as the basis for this disqualification the rule mentioned earlier, that a rabbi must resemble a מלאך ה'. It is difficult to understand, then, how Rav Moshe distinguishes in this regard between different kinds of Torah educators, as the rule of דומה למלאך ה' clearly refers to all teachers of Torah. Moreover, the Rambam cites this requirement of דומה למלאך ה' in Hilchos Talmud Torah, where he clearly indicates that a disgraced teacher is allowed to teach after he repents. Rav Moshe’s distinction, therefore, requires explanation.