Kerisos 3:9-10

Krisos 3:9

Rabbi Akiva also asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua what the law would be if a person slaughtered five sacrifices outside the Temple courtyard in a single state of unawareness, i.e., would he be required to bring a separate sin offering for each offense or only one sin offering for all of them? They answered that they hadn’t heard this particular law. Rabbi Yehoshua said that he heard that if a person eats of one offering from five different dishes in the same state of unawareness, then he is guilty of misappropriation for each dish. If such is the case regarding five dishes made from the same sacrifice, it should certainly be the case in Rabbi Akiva’s question about five separate sacrifices! [This “proof” doesn’t really work because the cases are not truly comparable but Rabbi Shimon reframes the question in a way that is.] Rabbi Shimon said that Rabbi Akiva didn’t ask the question the way it was phrased above. Rather, he asked about one who ate nosar (leftovers) from five different sacrifices in one state of unawareness, i.e., is he liable to only one sin offering for all of them or must he bring a separate sin offering for each of them? Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua replied that they hadn’t heard this particular law. Rabbi Yehoshua said that he heard that if a person eats of one offering from five different dishes in the same state of unawareness, then he is guilty of misappropriation for each dish. If such is the case regarding five dishes made from the same sacrifice, it should certainly be the case in Rabbi Akiva’s question about five separate sacrifices! Rabbi Akiva replied that if this is a tradition that Rabbi Yehoshua received, then he can accept it but if it’s a logical deduction on his part, then it can be refuted; Rabbi Yehoshua asked to hear the rebuttal. Rabbi Akiva replied that the cases are different because, when it comes to misappropriation, one who serves sanctified food to another person is as guilty as one who eats it and one who causes others to derive benefit from sanctified property is as guilty as one who personally used it. Not only that, but small volumes of misappropriated property combine even after a long time to render one liable. So we can't apply Rabbi Yehoshua’s conclusion to the case of nosar, where none of these stringencies apply.

Krisos 3:10

Rabbi Akiva reported asking Rabbi Eliezer the law if a person performs multiple acts of the same type of labor on more than one Shabbos but all in one state of unawareness, i.e., is he liable to only one sin offering for all of the violations or to a separate sin offering for each of them? Rabbi Eliezer replied that such a person must bring a separate sin offering for each of them. This can be derived through a kal v’chomer (an argument a fortiori) as follows: having relations with a menstruant woman doesn’t have multiple categories, nor does it have multiple ways to violate the prohibition. Nevertheless, one must bring a separate sin offering for each violation. This being the case, one should certainly be obligated to bring separate sin offerings for violating Shabbos, which has many categories of labor and many ways to violate the prohibition. Rabbi Akiva disagreed with Rabbi Eliezer’s logic. One might say this about relations with a menstruant woman in which there are two warnings, i.e., the man is warned not to have relations with the woman and the woman is warned not to have relations with the man. One cannot necessarily draw the same conclusion about Shabbos, regarding which there’s only one warning. Rabbi Eliezer said that his point could be proven from the case of a man who has relations with a menstruant minor. There, there’s only one warning (the girl not being warned because she’s a minor) but the man is nevertheless liable for each act. Rabbi Akiva replied that there’s still a difference: the girl may not be warned now but she will be later (i.e., when she reaches the age of majority). One cannot draw the same conclusions about Shabbos where the one warning that we have now is the only one that there will ever be. Rabbi Eliezer said that the prohibition against bestiality would prove his point (there only being one warning, to the human, and none to the animal). Rabbi Akiva agreed that this case is indeed comparable to that of Shabbos.