Kiddushin - Daf 64
- A father’s testimony that she was married and divorced vs. captured
The next Mishnah states that if a father says: קדשתיה וגרשתיה כשהיא קטנה – I married off [my daughter] and accepted her divorce while she was a minor, if she is still a ketanah, he is believed (to disqualify her from Kehunah). If she is an adult, he is not believed. If he says נשבית ופדיתיה – she was captured and I ransomed her, he is not believed, and she remains permitted to Kohanim. The Gemara initially understands the father is believed in the first case because it is currently בידיה – in his power (to marry her off and accept her divorce), and he has no reason to lie. He is not believed regarding his adult daughter’s marriage, nor regarding her captivity, because they are not within his ability.
This is challenged, and Rav Ashi adds that it is never in the father’s ability to compel her husband to divorce her, and even her marriage requires someone’s consent!? Rather, the Torah specifically granted a father believability regarding her marriage in the pasuk: "את בתי נתתי לאיש הזה" – I gave my daughter to this man in marriage.
- A husband’s testimony regarding his wife’s status for yibum: the power of מה לי לשקר
The next Mishnah teaches that one is believed to say before his death that he has children (exempting his wife from yibum) but is not believed to say he has brothers (subjecting her to yibum). This seems to disagree with Rebbe Nassan: If one told his wife at marriage that he has children or has no brothers (exempting her from yibum), and at his death said the opposite, Rebbe says he is not believed to subject her to yibum, and Rebbe Nassan says he is. Abaye ultimately explains that the Mishnah discusses someone presumed to be exempt from yibum, so he is not believed to change that status. The Baraisa discusses one presumed to be subject to yibum, who claimed at their marriage she was exempt. There is reason to believe him, because if he was lying, he could have instead assured her that he would divorce her before his death, exempting her from yibum. Rebbe holds: מה לי לשקר כי עדים דמי – the logic of “why should I lie” is as compelling as witnesses, thus completely uprooting the previous presumption, so he cannot reinstate it at death. Rebbe Nassan holds it is כי חזקה דמי – only as compelling as a presumption, and only weakened the original presumption, so if he retracts his testimony at death, he is believed.
- Machlokes if one is מחית איניש נפשיה לספיקא re: kiddushin of daughters
The next Mishnah states that one who has two sets of daughters from two wives, and declares that he accepted kiddushin for his “older” daughter, but is uncertain if it was the older of his older daughters, or the older of his younger daughters, or the younger of the older daughters, Rebbe Meir says: כולן אסורות חוץ מן הקטנה שבקטנות – all of them are prohibited to remarry without a get, except for the youngest of the younger daughters Rebbe Yose says: כולן מותרות חוץ מן הגדולה שבגדולות – they are all permitted, except for the oldest of the older daughters. The Gemara explains that Rebbe Meir holds: מחית איניש נפשיה לספיקא – a person would place himself in a position of doubt (by using a term with multiple possible meanings), and Rebbe Yose holds he would not, and only refers to the oldest daughter.
