Gittin - Daf 83

  • Tannaim’s challenges to Rebbe Eliezer’s ruling after his passing

A Baraisa relates that after Rebbe Eliezer’s passing, four Tannaim posed challenges to his validating a limited get. (1) Rebbe Tarfon asked, if she married the brother of the “prohibited man” (the one excluded from the get’s permit), and he died childless, לא נמצא זה עוקר דבר מן התורה – has [the first husband] not been found to uproot a law from the Torah by disqualifying her from yibum? Thus, such a get cannot be valid. (2) Rebbe Yose Haglili asked: היכן מצינו אסור לזה ומותר לזה – Where do we find someone prohibited to this man and permitted to that man? She should be either permitted or forbidden to everyone!? (3) Rebbe Elazar ben Azaryah asked: "כריתות" – the Torah calls divorce “severance,” דבר הכורת בינו לבינה – requiring something that completely severs the bond between him and her without limitations!? (4) Rebbe Akiva asked two more questions. Rebbe Yehoshua told them: אין משיבין את הארי לאחר מיתה – One cannot refute the lion after his death (although he himself posed a challenge later). The Gemara explains how all the questions can be refuted, except for Rebbe Elazar ben Azaryah’s.

  • Rebbe Eliezer agrees she is permitted to the “prohibited man” after a second marriage

The Gemara says that although Rebbe Eliezer holds that a limited get is effective, and she is prohibited to the man excluded by the husband, he agrees (where he permitted her to everyone “except” Ploni) that if she married another man, and the marriage subsequently ended (by the husband dying or divorcing), שמותרת לזה שנאסרה עליו – that she becomes permitted to this man to whom she was prohibited, because the second marriage completely severs her first marriage. Rebbe Shimon ben Elazar objected: היכן מצינו שזה אוסר וזה מתיר – Where do we find that this man prohibits something, and that man permits it? How can the first husband’s prohibition be absolved by the second husband’s marriage?

Three proofs are presented to demonstrate that it is indeed possible for one person to permit what another person prohibited: (1) a yavam permits a yevamah with chalitzah, ending the first husband’s prohibition, (2) a Sage can nullify someone’s nedarim, and (3) a husband can revoke his wife’s nedarim. All three challenges are rejected.

  • Permanent conditions vs. temporary conditions

The Gemara asks what the other Tannaim (besides Rebbe Elazar ben Azaryah), who did not challenge Rebbe Eliezer above from the word "כריתות", learn from this word. It answers that it teaches that all conditions to a divorce must have an endpoint, as a Baraisa teaches: ה"ז גיטך ע"מ שלא תשתי יין – If he says, “Here is your get, on condition you do not drink wine,” ע"מ שלא תלכי לבית אביך – or on condition you do not go to your father’s house,” לעולם אין זה כריתות – if the condition was made forever, this is not severance and the get is invalid. שלשים יום ה"ז כריתות – It is was made for thirty days, this is sufficient severance and the get is valid. Rava says, according to the Gemara’s final version: כל ימי חייכי – If he dictates a condition to last “all the days of your (the wife’s) life,” אין זה כריתות – this is not severance, since she cannot outlive the condition. כל ימי חיי או חיי פלוני – If he said, “all the days of my life,” or “all the days of Ploni’s life,” ה"ז כריתות – this is sufficient severance, since she can outlive the condition.