No Late Minyan: Am I Forced to Accept Shabbos Early?
Scenario: It is a Friday afternoon during the Summer time. The day is long, but there are no “late” minyan options around shkiyah i.e sunset time. Instead, the only minyanim being offered at the local synagogues are scheduled for 7:00 P.M. or earlier.1 There may be a later minyan taking place at someone’s home, but you are not sure whether that is actually the case or whether that even matters. You are not feeling well and cannot make it to services that evening, may you delay accepting Shabbos until closer to shkiyah or are you compelled to accept it earlier around the time the synagogues approach the end of Kabbalas Shabbos?
The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 263:12)2 writes that “If most of the community has accepted Shabbos, the minority is forcibly drawn after them.”
At first glance, we would appear to have a significant qualification. If only a fraction of the community is attending services and accepting Shabbos early then those wishing to accept Shabbos at the standard 18 minutes before sunset have nothing to be concerned about.
The Mishnah Berurah (263:51)3 elaborates:
If the majority of the congregation was not in the synagogue they would not be drawn after the minority [that is present in the synagogue]. Likewise, when a city has many synagogues, one [synagogue] cannot pull the other after it - even if it possesses the majority. However, if one hosts a minyan at his home - even if it is established - it would be nullified vis-a-vis the majority [present at the actual synagogues(s)].
Each synagogue is its own jurisdiction. Therefore, the larger synagogue in town does not possess the power to cause a smaller synagogue to accept Shabbos earlier. However, a regular Friday night service that takes place at someone’s home would not be significant enough to establish its own jurisdiction, even if they meet every Friday night.4 So what happens if none of the local synagogues offer a sunset-service? It would seem in such a case that the entire community must accept Shabbos at an earlier time.
However, this assumes that the majority of the community is actually present at a synagogue Friday evening service The aforementioned Mishnah Berurah wrote: “If the majority of the congregation was not in the synagogue they would not be drawn after the minority.” Thus, our scenario depends on a pivotal factor: How do we quantify the “majority”?
It goes without saying that we are only discussing the Jewish people in a given town, however we can further narrow down who qualifies for this “majority”:
(1) The Piskei Teshuvos (263, fn. 343), based on Shulchan Aruch HaRav’s usage employment of the Talmud in Berachos (45b) asserts that for ritual purposes a tzibbur (community) is assessed based on the number of men. (This is also practically necessary, because otherwise, if there is a majority of women in the community then all men would also be forced to accept Shabbos 18 minutes before sunset and would not be able to drive to synagogue.)5
(2) Further narrowing down our pool of eligible applicants, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Halichos Shlomo, Vol. 1, 14:3) rules that we only base our assessment of the majority on those who are actually Shabbos-observant. This is logical, as one who does not keep Shabbos cannot be said to have accepted Shabbos. Therefore, in a town in which the majority of Jews are not Shabbos-observant the “majority” would actually be determined from within the minority of Jews who in principle intend to keep Shabbos.6
(3) R. Yitzchok Yaakov Weiss (Responsa Minchas Yitzchak 1:24)7 provides the most critical circumscription of how we define the “majority” of the community. He cites the Chasam Sofer (C.M. 116) who writes that if a city invites its residents to come vote on matters that concern the community, those who opt to stay home are implicitly deferring the decision to the people who show up. R. Weiss extrapolates this framework to our case and suggests that those who attend the communal prayer services get to determine when the rest of the individuals residing in the same town accept Shabbos. Moreover, R. Weiss cites adds that every man is obligated to pray with a minyan (see Shulchan Aruch O.C. 90:9) - thus, a man who neglects his religious responsibility of joining the community in prayer has thereby forfeited his right to an opinion on when the community is accepting Shabbos.
Bringing these data-points together, we can conclude that the “majority” of the community for Shabbos-acceptance purposes is based on Shabbos-observant, minyan-going men. Therefore, if the community synagogues are all scheduled to have their main services at an earlier time then all individuals in the community, regardless of whether they are attending services, would be required to accept Shabbos when the latest service is projected to reach Bo’i V’Shalom/Mizmor Shir toward the end of the Kabbalas Shabbos prayers.
However, what if there is a small, solitary, sunset-service scheduled at one of the local synagogues, would that suffice to enable everyone else to accept Shabbos at a later time?
While the aforementioned Minchas Yitzchak takes a stringent view on this,8 there are authorities such as R. Moshe Stern (Responsa Be’er Moshe 2:19) who hold that attendees of a sunset-service, even if it is smaller than the earlier option, are not beholden to when the larger minyan accepts Shabbos.9 The Piskei Teshuvos (263:38-39) suggests that if necessary, one who is not attending services could rely on the existence of a later service and would not be required to accept Shabbos when the larger service takes place at an earlier time.
However, absent any local synagogue hosting a sunset-service, it would appear that all of the individuals in the community would be beholden to when the synagogues are projected to reach toward the end of Kabbalas Shabbos. So what happens if there is a sunset-service scheduled, but then they do not get ten men for a minyan to actually show up?
There is a tentative ruling from R. Moshe Feinstein (Responsa Igros Moshe (O.C. 3:38)10 which could potentially save us. R. Feinstein was asked whether a woman whose husband attends an early Friday service would be required to accept Shabbos along with him or if she could delay her acceptance of the standard 18 minute candle-lighting time. In general, R. Feinstein holds that a woman is bound to her husband’s customs, as when she marries him she effectively enters his makom (lit. place) and is thereby bound by the customs of her new residence.11 Thus, it depends on the husband’s motivation for accepting Shabbos early. If he is so enthralled and enchanted by the sanctity of Shabbos and is committed to accepting it as a significantly advanced time as a religious stringency then his wife may very well be required to follow suit. However, if the real reason he is attending an earlier service is out of convenience, such as eating dinner at a normal time, then he is not truly practicing a custom of accepting Shabbos early, and therefore his wife would not be bound by his choice to attend an earlier service.
R. Feinstein tentatively suggests that we could extrapolate this same distinction to our case in which the majority of the community holds earlier services. He suggests that if the only reason the community offers an early service is out of convenience, then it is possible that they do not necessarily mean for everyone to accept Shabbos at that time but this is just incidentally the easiest time to gather a minyan. Therefore, similar to how a wife would not be bound by her husband, the rest of the individuals would not be beholden to the earlier minyan time.
We must stress, however, that while R. Moshe Feinstein was one of the greatest rabbinic scholars of recent years, he is still a minority position12 - and even he himself expressed a lack of confidence in his own reasoning. Therefore, if the community members wish to begin Shabbos at the standard 18 minutes before sunset, I would suggest that it is imperative that they collectively offer a later service at one of the local synagogues. And, we may add, that it is also imperative that the community actually supports it. If, God forbid, after performing due diligence, a minyan does not materialize one week, it would certainly make sense that they could rely on the potential leniency of R. Feinstein in order that those accepting Shabbos at the later time are not in any form of violation of [Tosefes] Shabbos. However, we should emphasize that such a decision should be deferred to the mara d’asra, the learned rabbinic leader of every community who is entrusted to render the best halachic decision for his own constituency.
I pray that, God willing, this entire discussion becomes theoretical and that all communities should have enough men committed to fulfilling their obligation of praying together with the congregation so that the above analysis will be rendered l’drosh u’lilabeil sechar - to learn for the sake of Torah study alone.
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Please note that the information presented above is only intended as a summary of the topic. There are many intersecting areas of Jewish law such as Zemanim, Tosefes Shabbos, and Minhag that are each deserving of a more expansive analysis. As mentioned earlier, please consult your local rabbi for practical guidance.
1. There is a related issue of taretei d’sasri (see Shuchan Aruch O.C. 231:1) which is beyond the scope of this summary. We may substitute the 7:00 P.M. minyan with a plag haminchah minyan instead.
2. See Mordechai (end of Ch. 2 in Shabbos); Rivam.
3. It is not enough simply for the majority of individuals to accept Shabbos, it needs to be a communal act (see Shemiras Shabbos K’Hilchasah Ch. 46, fn. 31, and Chut HaShani Vol. 4, 83:12).
4. See Piskei Teshuvos (263, fn. 347) who extrapolates this to services held at a hotel.
5. In Responsa Igros Moshe (O.C. 1:96), R. Feinstein writes that from a strictly halachic standpoint, there is no issue of driving to synagogue during the 18 minutes prior to sunset. Even if onlookers mistakenly think that the 18 minutes are off-limits, their ignorance does not turn this into a situation of maris ayin (the issue of doing something that has the appearance of sin). However, since R. Feinstein was a public-rabbinic figure he committed to trying to avoid doing so in order that the common person would not infer a cavalier approach to Shabbos from his actions.
6. He adds in fn. 7 that on this premise there would be no imperative to delay Shabbos in order to mitigate the amount of time that the other Jews in town would be violating Shabbos, since these individuals do not intend to observe Shabbos they are not included in the communal acceptance of Shabbos.
7. See also Responsa Minchas Yitzchak (10:20). It is worth noting that there is room to debate whether the qualification of the Minchas Yitzchak should be accepted as normative. On the one hand, his condition does not appear to be widely espoused in the literature - a point made to me by my colleagues Rabbi Roy Feldman and Rabbi Yair Lichtman. On the other hand, perhaps the other rabbinic authorities understood this position as a davar pashut (not requiring to be spelled out) since in the more religiously-committed world, the culture is that healthy, observant men attend Friday night services. Indeed, Dayan Weiss himself claims that his position is supported by haskamas kol gedolei haposkim shelo chalku bazeh - a consensus of the preeminent halachic decisors.
8. The Minchas Yitzchak (prior source) also addresses a synagogue with two Friday minyanim. He posits that if both minyanim join together for Shacharis on Shabbos day then they are assessed as one congregation for determining when Shabbos is accepted. Thus, if the earlier minyan is larger, then even the later minyan attendees would be required to accept at least the Biblical prohibitions of Shabbos earlier.
9. See also Shemiras Shabbos K’Hilchasah (46:7). The She’arim Metzuyanim B’Halachah (Kuntres Acharon 75:1) adds that this is certainly true if the rabbi of the synagogue attends the later service.
10. However, see Responsa Shevet HaLevi (7:35) who insists that the wife should virtually always accept Shabbos at the same time as her husband. Cf. the discussion regarding a husband who recites Shemoneh Esrei earlier on Shabbos day and whether that impacts when his wife needs to recite Kiddush (see Responsa Igros Moshe O.C. Vol. 4, 101:2 and Shemiras Shabbos K’Hilchasah Ch. 52, fn. 46).
11. See Responsa Igros Moshe (O.C. 1:158).
12. See also R. Moshe Shternbuch in Responsa Teshuvos V’Hanhagos (3:85) who concurs with R. Feinstein’s suggestion. My thanks to Dayan Elimelech Vanzetta for bringing this responsum to my attention.