Gittin - Daf 25
- ברירה regarding gittin and korbon pesach
Rav Hoshaya asked Rav Yehudah: אמר ללבלר כתוב לאיזו שתצא בפתח תחילה מהו – If one said to the scribe, “Write [a get] for whichever wife exits the doorway first,” what is the halachah? Can bereirah be applied to retroactively consider the get written for the one who later exited the doorway? He resolved it from our Mishnah, which taught that if a scribe was asked to write a get for the wife which he will later choose, it is invalid, proving we do not rely on bereirah. Rav Hoshaya challenged this from a Mishnah about korbon pesach, where someone told his sons, “I am shechting the pesach for whichever of you comes first to Yerushalayim,” and it concludes: כיון שנכנס ראשון ראשו ורובו – as soon as the first one enters Yerushalayim with his head and most of [his body], זכה בחלקו ומזכה את אחיו עמו – he acquires his portion and acquires portions for his brothers along with him. We see, then, that we do rely on bereirah to include them in the pesach!? Rav Yehudah responded that this case was not based on bereirah, for the father had actually intended the pesach to be for all his children. He only told them otherwise כדי לזרזן במצות – to galvanize them in mitzvos. The Gemara brings two proofs to this point.
- תולה בדעת אחרים and תולה בדעת עצמו
Abaye wondered: קא בעי מיניה תולה בדעת אחרים – [Rav Hoshaya] asked [Rav Yehudah] about bereirah where one hinges the determination on the decision of others (i.e., the wife who chooses to leave first), וקא פשיט ליה תולה בדעת עצמו – and [Rav Yehudah] resolved it for him from a case of one who hinges the determination on his own decision (i.e., whichever he later chooses to divorce), והדר מותיב ליה תולה בדעת אחרים – and [Rav Hoshaya] later challenged him from a case of one who hinges the determination on the decision of others (i.e., the brother who first reaches Yerushalayim). Perhaps the cases cannot be compared, because leaving the determination to others indicates he has finalized his own decision, whereas when he leaves the determination to his own decision, perhaps we cannot rely on bereirah since he remains uncertain!? Rava rejected this distinction and said that anyone who relies on bereirah does so in both cases, and anyone who does not, does not in either case.
- Distinguishing between ברירה in the case of Kusi tevel wine vs. cases of get and kiddushin
Rav Mesharshiya attempted to prove that two Tannaim do make the above distinction. He first established that Rebbe Yehudah and Rebbe Shimon both do not rely on bereirah in a case of תולה בדעת עצמו, from a Baraisa where one wishes to drink from Kusi wine which is tevel and declares that the terumah and maaser he will later separate are designated now. Both Tannaim do not allow him to drink based on this method, apparently because they do not rely on bereirah in such a case. Yet, each can be shown to rely on bereirah in a case of תולה בדעת אחרים. Rebbe Yehudah validates a get which is made dependent retroactively on whether the husband dies from his current illness (which depends on Hashem’s decision). A Baraisa is quoted to prove the same about Rebbe Shimon: הריני בועליך על מנת שירצה אבא – One who says, “I am having relations with you to effect kiddushin on condition that my father consents to the marriage,” Rebbe Shimon is quoted as saying: רצה האב מקודשת – If the father consents, she is married, לא רצה האב אינה מקודשת – but if the father does not consent, she is not married. This shows that the later decision of the father retroactively effects kiddushin. Rava rejects this proof, because their position by terumah of wine is not because of bereirah, but out of concern that the wineskin might break open, and the wine will spill out, before separating the terumah and maaser. This will result in his having drunk tevel retroactively.
