D’rachehah Darchei Noam: Part Two

In an earlier chapter,[1] we discussed the principle regarding Torah formulated by Shomo Hamelech (Mishlei 3:17), that “דְּרָכֶיהָ דַרְכֵי נֹעַם — Its ways are ways of pleasantness.” This principle finds expression in every area of learning and understanding Torah. Let us now resume this discussion, apropos to Parshat Tazria, by seeing how “Derachehah Darchei Noam” affects Signon Hakatuv — the way the Torah expresses itself.The Sequence of Tzoraat

Rabbeinu Bachye (Vayikra 14:54–56) writes:

The tradition received by Chazal (Midrash Tanchuma Metzora, siman 4) describes the order of the types of tzoraat as they occur in actuality. Initially, Hashem afflicts the person’s house, in order that his heart shall be contrite and he may examine his ways and do teshuvah. If he did teshuvah — well and good. If not, He afflicts his clothes. If he did teshuvah — well and good. If not — He afflicts his body itself. Nonetheless, that is not the way things are ordered in the parshiyot (sections), for the first parsha discusses “נֶגַע צָרַעַת כִּי תִהְיֶה בְּאָדָם — an affliction of tzoraat if it should be in a person” (13:9), after that comes “וְהַבֶּגֶד כִּי יִהְיֶה בוֹ נֶגַע צָרָעַת — If a garment should have an affliction of tzoraat” (pasuk 47), and the final parsha is “וְנָתַתִּי נֶגַע צָרַעַת בְּבֵית אֶרֶץ אֲחֻזַּתְכֶם — And I will place a tzoraat affliction upon a house in the Land of your possession” (14:34)![2]

The reason why the Torah chose this way, namely, to mention first tzoraat of the body, then of clothing and finally of houses, is because “Derachehah Darchei Noam,” all the Torah’s ways are ways of pleasantness. Therefore, it ordered them in a way that the afflictions should not proceed in increasing levels of suffering, as is in fact the case,[3] but rather in decreasing levels of suffering, as indicated by the order of the parshiyot.

In other words, the principle of “Darchei Noam” finds expression in the way in which the afflictions are presented in the pasuk, as going from more severe to less severe (which is a “positive approach”), and not, chas veshalom, from less severe to more severe. We thus see that the parameters of pshuto shel mikra may sometimes be entirely different than those of the halachic reality, as known to us through kaballat Rabboteinu z”l.

Darchei Noam in the Realm of Halachah

From the Beit Midrash of the Rishonim, we now turn to the Gedolei Ha’Acharonim to see from their words how the concept of “Darchei Noam” affects the way the halachah itself is written in the Torah. Let us begin with the Meshech Chochmah (Vayikra 2:14, s.v. ve’im takriv):

With regards to the korban omer, the Torah did not write that the remnant of the korban shall be eaten by Aharon and his sons, as it did with other korbanot minchah.[4] Similarly, this (the Kohanim eating the remnant of the korban) is not mentioned with regards to the korban of the Sotah,[5] rather, the Gemara Bavli (Menachot 72b) and Yerushalmi (Sotah 3:1) derives this from derashot. The reason the Torah did not write this explicitly is because barley (from which the korban omer and korban sotah are brought) is animal food, and therefore the Torah did not wish to state that Aharon and his sons should divide them, for this is not in keeping with their honor. Hashem has more consideration for the honor of His creations than He does for the honor of the Mizbeach![6]

Yibum and Chalitzah

Perhaps, based on this principle of “Darchei Noam,” we may suggest an explanation concerning a shift in phraseology within the parsha of Yibum. In the event of chalitzah, the Torah requires the woman to say about her deceased husband’s brother “לֹא אָבָה יַבְּמִי — He does not wish to perform Yibum with me” (Devarim 25:7), whereas in the very next pasuk the brother is required to say “לֹא חָפַצְתִּי לְקַחְתָּהּ — I do not wish to marry her” (ibid., pasuk 8). The change in wording between these two pesukim is quite peculiar:

1.   Why do they not both use either the term “אבה,” or the term “חפץ”?

2.   Apart from this, why does she say he does not wish “יַבְּמִי — to perform Yibum with me” while he says he does not wish “לְקַחְתָּהּ — to marry her”?

We would like to suggest that with these shifts in nuance the Torah is demonstrating special sensitivity, both to the man and to the woman:

·      The term “חפץ” reflects a desire or attraction which is not intellectual in nature, but emotional, whereas the term “אבה” represents a connection that is based on intellectual grounds.[7]

·      Additionally, the term “lakach” refers to the act of Kiddushin (as in " כִּי יִקַּח אִישׁ אִשָּׁה" — Devarim 24:1), whereas the term “yabam” refers, of course, to the mitzvah of Yibum.

With this in mind, we will understand that it would not be “darchei noam” to require the woman to say that this man did not find her attractive to the extent that he would like to marry her, therefore, all she has to say is that he does not wish to perform the mitzvah of Yibum with her. On the other hand, it is also not in keeping with “darchei noam” to require the man to say that he is not prepared to fulfill a mitzvah of the Torah. Instead, he merely says that he does not feel sufficiently attracted on an emotional level to take this woman as his wife, which does not reflect badly on anyone involved.

Therefore, when the Torah itself describes the situation, it also says “וְאִם לֹא יַחְפֹּץ הָאִישׁ לָקַחַת אֶת יְבִמְתּוֹ  — And if the man does not wish to marry his sister-in law”[8] (Devarim 25:7), and does not say “וְאִם לֹא אָבָה הָאִישׁ לְיַבֵּם — And if the man decides not to perform Yibum.”[9]

This, in my humble opinion, is the way to explain the terms used by the Torah in presenting the mitzvah of Yibum based on the theme of “Darchei Noam,” and this is especially appropriate with this mitzvah, where the Torah itself provides an alternative (chalitzah) in the event that the mitzvah of Yibum is not performed.

Darchei Noam and Taamei HaMitzvot

Taking the discussion one stage further, we should note that “Darchei Noam” affects not only the way the Torah writes about things, it also expresses itself in the reasons for mitzvot.

For example, the Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 376) explains the reason for the mitzvah of a Kohen to become tamei for a member of his immediate family:

A regular Kohen, even though he is sanctified, becomes tamei for them [the seven close family members]. The reason for this, it appears, is that kedushah of a Kohen devolves upon him naturally, it is not something that he chose to receive, rather he was sanctified at birth due to the kedushah of his Tribe. This means that his interaction with his family is the same as anyone else’s, for there is no difference between him and them except that there are times when he performs the Avodah in the Beit Hamikdash. But there are also times when he is residing in his home, and enjoying the company of his friends. At times of rejoicing and feasting he will invite his friends and relatives. Therefore, he will become very emotionally attached to them, and they to him. And it is for this reason he is permitted to become tamei for them for “the ways of Torah are pleasant, and all its pathways are peace.”

There is a similar discussion of “Darchei Noam” and taamei hamitzvot in the Beit Midrash of Rabbeinu Bachye (Vayikra 11:30, s.v. vehachomet):

The Torah mentioned eight sheratzim and said (pasuk 31) “אֵלֶּה הַטְּמֵאִים לָכֶם — These shall be tamei for you,” yet the snake is not counted among them. This is very strange, for it would certainly have been appropriate for the snake to be tamei and render others tamei, for he is the source of tumah and spiritual pollution, as is known from the original Snake (in Gan Eden). If so, why would the pesukim not include it among the sheratzim that cause tumah? However, the matter is on account of the ways of the Torah, “whose pathways are peace,” that it did not wish for the snake to cause tumah through contact, for if so, a person may refrain from killing a snake in order not to become tamei.

Returning to the matter of tzoraat, in this next paragraph we will see how the Meshech Chochmah (Vayikra 13:3, s.v. vera’a hakohen) uses the principle of “Darchei Noam” to explain the pasuk al derech hapshat in a way that is parallel to (but not in conflict with) something Chazal derived al derech hamidrash:

There is an obvious repetition in the pasuk,[10] see the Torat Kohanim there.[11] It is possible to explain, based on Chazal, that the meaning of the first phrase is that he should see the nega and determine if it should be pronounced tamei, i.e. if it has a sign of tumah — white hair. The second phrase, “vera’ahu HaKohen” means the Kohen should look at the person and see if it is appropriate to render him tamei. (for example) if he is newly married, they allow him the seven days of feasting, similarly, if it is a Chag, he is given all seven days of Chag in order not to disrupt his joy (Moed Katan 7b), for “Derachehah Darchei Noam.” Therefore “vera’ahu” means to examine the person’s situation, whether it is appropriate to render him tamei at that time. And this is the meaning of the words later on (Pasuk 14) “וּבְיוֹם הֵרָאוֹת בּוֹ — and on the day it appears with it” (from which Chazal derived that) there are days when the person is not examined. In other words, this idea of choosing not to examine the person is only affected by time, and we do not say, for example, that if his emotional constitution required that he stay in other people’s company and other such considerations, that we would not examine him, rather,[12] it is only the question of timing that affects when he is seen; understand this well.

Darchei Noam as a Factor in Determining Halachah

So far we have seen how the principle of “Derachehah Darchei Noam” can affect the way the Torah writes things, as well as how it can be used to explain the reason for certain mitzvot in the Torah. We will conclude this discussion by referring to a third area that can also be “influenced” by “Derachehah Darchei Noam,” which is that of Chazal using this principle to determine the correct interpretation of a mitzvah in the Torah! There are occasions when the pasuk could have been explained in more than one way, and Chazal invoked “Darchei Noam,” and with that established the halachah for all time. A classic example of this is the discussion which takes place in Masechet Sukkah 32a regarding identifying the arba minim, specifically, the lulav:

[The Gemara asks:] Yet, perhaps the reference is to a “kufra” (Rashi: which is similar to a palm branch, except it is only one or two years old, and the wood has not yet thickened)?

Said Abaye: It is written, “derachehah darchei noam vechol netivoteha shalom” (Rashi: And these [kufra branches] are like thistles with many thorns protruding from them which can lacerate the hands).

Applying the above idea, that “Darchei Noam” can help determine the halachah when more than one possibility exists as to what the pasuk is referring to, the Meshech Chochmah refers us to a halachah that relates to Avodat Yom HaKippurim. The Mishnah (Yoma 1:1) states that in order for the Avodah to be valid, the Kohen Gadol must be married. The source of this halachah is the pasuk which states (Vayikra 16:6) “וְכִפֶּר בַּעֲדוֹ וּבְעַד בֵּיתוֹ — He shall atone for himself and for his household,” as the Mishnah explains: “ביתו זו אשתו — “Household,” refers to his wife.” The Mishnah further states that in order to safeguard against a potential disqualification of the Kohen Gadol’s Avodah, another woman would be designated whom he could immediately marry in the event that his wife passed away on Yom Kippur. Concerning this enactment, the Meshech Chochmah (Vayikra 16:6, s.v. vechiper) comments:

The term “ביתו” can also denote his children,[13] in which case, (the halachah should be that) if his children die on Yom Kippur it should likewise invalidate the Avodah. Nevertheless, the Torah’s “ways are ways of pleasantness,” therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the above halachah applies only to his wife, since it is possible for him to marry another.[14]

And so we see that in each of the three major areas of halachah, machshavah and parshanut, the principle of “Derachehah Darchei Noam” is active, influential, and decisive.

[1] See Parshat Noach.

[2] So that the order in the pasuk is the exact opposite of the order transmitted to us through Kabbalat Chazal.

[3] Namely, in actuality, as per Kabbalat Chazal.

[4] See e.g. Vayikra 2:3.

[5] See Bamidbar Perek 5.

[6] For the Torah does write explicitly that these korbanot of barley are offered on the Mizbeach.

[7] [The Rav does not cite a source for this distinction.]

[8] Reflecting his lack of emotional attraction to her.

[9] Which would represent a lack of commitment on his part in keeping mitzvot.

[10] The pasuk begins with the words “וראה הכהן את הנגע — And the Kohen shall see the affliction,” and then says “וראהו הכהן — And the Kohen shall see it.”

[11] Chap. 2, sec. 8; “Vera’ahu — the nega must be entirely visible at the same time. If it was on two sides of his nose or finger, he is not tamei.” In other words, the Torat Kohanim explains the words “vera’ahu” refers to the nega itself. In contrast, the Meshech Chochmah will explain that it refers to the person who is afflicted.

[12] This is the chiddush contained within the words “vera’ahu hakohen,” which Meshech Chochmah explains is parallel to the drashah of Chazal on the words “uv’yom hera’ot,” namely, that the person must be examined to see if he is able to be quarantined as a metzora during that time.

[13] See Kiddushin 22a, where the Gemara states that an eved ivri only stays on beyond the term of six years if the master has a wife and children. This is based on the pasuk in Devarim (15:16) which states, “כי אהבך ואת ביתך — For he loves you and your household.” This teaches us that the full definition of the word “בית” as household includes both a wife and children.

[14] If the term “ביתו” was taken as referring to his children as well, then in the event that they died chas veshalom, the tragedy of their death would be compounded by the fact that the Avodah of Yom Kippur — and together with it the kaparah of Am Yisrael — would be disqualified without the possibility of rectification. Therefore, in this instance, the principle of “Derachehah Darchei Noam” limits the scope of the term “ביתו” to include only his wife. To be sure, this entire idea applies only in situations where a number of interpretations are possible; for then we say that “Derachehah Darchei Noam” can guide us in choosing the one the Torah was referring to. In an instance when the words of the pasuk are unequivocal, such as the requirement to destroy an ir hanidachat, “Derachehah Darchei Noam” cannot serve to change what has been plainly stated.