Resources for Yevamos daf 117
1. The משנה says that ב"ה said that we can believe a lady regarding the death of her husband to allow her to remarry but not to collect the כתובה. ב"ש disagrees because the כתובה says she gets the כתובה as soon as she remarries, no matter what. Everyone agreed that the יורשים can’t collect their inheritance. In the end, ב"ה agreed to ב"ש. How do we understand ב"ש’s שיטה? Does he mean to say that the עד אחד isn’t believed at all regarding the כתובה and the only reason she gets her כתובה is because she got remarried and that fits the words of the כתובה? If so, what if he shows up the next day alive? Does she still keep her כתובה? That is the opinion of the אבני מילואים in סימן ק. However, most אחרונים disagree. The קובץ הערות inסימן כ"א ס"ק ו explains as follows: if the husband didn’t die, the קידושין to the second husband was never תופס so it turns out she never got remarried in which case she shouldn’t keep the כתובה. The only other possibility is to say that the תנאי כתובה is that she gets the כתובה even if it isn’t even a real marriage as long as she appeared to remarry. However, that can’t be since the גמרא in שבועות דף ל"ב says that if an עד falsely testifies that a woman’s husband died he must bring a קרבן שבועה since he caused a loss of the כתובה to the husband. רב אלחנן זצ"ל says that if the עד אחד isn’t really believed in regards to the כתובה and the only reason the woman gets her כתובה is because of the תנאי then he isn’t חייב a קרבן שבועה since that is only a חיוב for something that happens בתורת עדות and not as a side תנאי. Therefore, it must be that the עד and the wife are believed בתורת עדות on the כתובה as well, but not regarding the נחלה. Which leaves us with the question why would we say פּלגינן נאמנות by the נחלה and not the כתובה (which was ב"ה’s point)? The answer is that we only say פּלגינן נאמנות when there is one עדות which is relevant to several things. However, where something is only a result of the testimony, then we cannot divide the two concepts and if you are believed for one you are believed for the other even בתורת עדות. Therefore, we can say פּלגינן נאמנות and believe her about her husband’s death regarding her remarrying but not regarding the נחלה. However, when we believe the woman to remarry it will naturally result in the חיוב כתובה being triggered, so we are forced to believe her on both.
2. The גמרא says that if we believed one עד and allowed a woman to get married then we would not accept the testimony of another עד who comes to contradict that עדות since anytime the תורה believed one עד they are considered like two עדים and one עד can’t beat two עדים. There is a מחלוקת ראשונים when this is true. The ר"ן, רשב"א, and most ראשונים hold that this concept of כל מקום שהאמינה תורה עד אחד הר הוא כשנים applies to all איסורים. The ש"ך in יו"ד סימן קש"ז ס"ק י"ד discusses this at length and brings the מהרי"ק (which the שו"ע paskens like) who says that we only consider an עד אחד to be like two עדים when the first עד came to ב"ד and ב"ד paskened based on his testimony and only then did the second עד came. However, if the two עד אחדs came at the same time then they would cancel each other out since they both should be believed as two! The only exception to that is in a case where the תורה gave a special added believability to an עד אחד for some reason like by a סוטה or שוחט. In that case the first עד is believed like two even when they come together. The נימוקי יוסף on דף כ"ח בדפּי הרי"ף brings the ר"י who disagrees and says the whole concept of כל מקום שהאמינה תורה עד אחד הר הוא כשנים is only by places where the עד shouldn’t have been believed and for some reason is believed like by a סוטה and עדות אשה where the rule should have been אין דבר שבערוה פּחות משנים and yet we believe an עד אחד. In those cases we say that anyone who is believed when they shouldn’t have been is a super עד and considered like two witnesses. However, by all regular איסורים all עד אחדs are the same regardless of when they came and will always cancel each other out. Theרמב"ם inפּרק י"ב מהלכות גירושין הל׳ י"ח also sounds like the דין of כל מקום שהאמינה וכו׳ is something unique to עדות אשה and the like. However, רב חיים זצ"ל in חידושי רבי חיים הלוי on the רמב"ם in הלכות רוצח פּרק ט הל׳ י"ד points out that the רמב"ם can’t hold like the reasoning of the ר"י since the רמב"ם holds a אשה is believed to say someone’s husband is dead yet she is not considered like two witnesses if another עד contradicts her. It must be therefore that theרמב"ם holds as follows: the תורה chose to believe an עד אחד who says that the husband is dead or the wife was נטמאה even though it is a דבר שבערוה. However, anyone who contradicts that person and says the husband is alive should not be believed since the תורה didn’t give them any special believability. If so, why would we need the concept of כל מקום שהאמינה וכו׳ if an עד אחד is not believed by a דבר שבערוה anyway? The answer is that even though the תורה chose to believe an עד אחד even though it is a דבר שבערוה, it doesn’t necessarily mean he is like two עדים and perhaps a second contradictory עד should cancel out the first since it is one against one. Therefore the גמרא tells us this second clause of כל מקום שהאמינה וכו׳ to tell us that an עד אחד is believed in this case like two עדים. That second הלכה only applies to a real עד אחד but not to an or עבד אשה. So even though an אשה is fully believed in this case, she would not be considered like two עדים to stop הכחשת עד אחד.
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