Resources for Yevamos daf 114
1. The גמרא says that even if you hold by a קטן אוכל נבילות that אין ב"ד מצווין להפרישו, you are not allowed to be מאכיל the child בידים or to tell him explicitly to do an עברה. That is an איסור דאורייתא of “לא תאכילם”. The פּמ"ג in סימן שמ"ג משבצות זהב א is of the opinion that the טור disagrees with this and holds there is only an איסור דאורייתא to feed a child איסור by the three examples the גמרא gives (דם, שרצים, וטומאה) but by other איסורים it is only אסור מדרבנן. This would be against the רמב"ם who says inהלכות מאכלות אסורות פּרק י"ז הל׳ כ"ז וכ"ח that the איסור to feed איסור to a child it applies to all איסורים. The רשב"א has a tremendous חידוש here and says that the איסור of being מאכיל a child איסור is only by איסורים דאורייתא. However, one is allowed to feed איסור דרבנן to a child or tell a child to do an איסור דרבנן. His logic is that even according to the מ"ד that ב"ד is מצווין להפרישו, they are not מצווין להפרישו from an איסור דרבנן. Therefore, we who pasken that ב"ד is never מצווין להפרישו can go down one level and say one only can’t be מאכיל an איסור דאורייתא but can be מאכיל an איסור דרבנן.
2. The רמב"ם also says that even though ב"ד is not obligated to stop a child from doing an עברה, his father must stop him because of the מצוה of חינוך. The רשב"א disagrees and says the משמעות of our גמרא is that no one needs to stop him, including the father. Therefore, the רשב"א is מחדש an incredible חידוש: the מצוה of חינוך only applies to מצות עשה but does not apply to מצות לא תעשה!
3. The גמרא brings the מחלוקת about whether קטן אוכל נבילות, ב"ד מצווין להפרישו or not. There is a מחלוקת אחרונים as to how to explain this מחלוקת. The קובץ הערות in סימן ע"ה אות ד explains that it is clear from the גמרא earlier on דף ל"ג that a child is not מצווה in any מצוה at all in a personal sense since the גמרא there says that an example of 2 איסורים being חל at the same second is a case where a child got 2 שערות on שבת where the איסור זרות and שבת are חל at the same time. So it is clear that no איסור exists in childhood. Yet the גמרא says in סנהדרין that when a child sins on purpose it is considered a “תקלה”. He explains that although there is no actual איסור for a child, there is still the סיבת האיסור which exists. Consequently, the מ"ד who holds ב"ד מצווין להפרישו holds that even if only the סיבת האיסור exists it is enough for us to have to stop the child. The one who holds אין ב"ד מצווין להפרישו holds there is no need to prevent a child from doing something when there is no actual איסור on the child. He also explains based on this the following: according to the שיטות mentioned above (number 1) that there is no איסור to feed a child non-kosher food other than דם and שרצים, how is a child allowed to be שוחט an animal and a גוי isn’t? They can both eat the animal without שחיטה! He answers that even though the איסור itself doesn’t exist for the child on a personal level, the סיבת האיסור is still there for the child while it isn’t there for the גוי. The אבני נזר in יו"ד סימן ש אות י disagrees and says the מחלוקת is whether there is any concept of איסור at all by a child. If you hold בית דין must stop a child from eating treif then you hold there is an actual איסור for the child but the child is simply an אונס so Hashem doesn’t punish them. If you hold you don’t need to stop him then that means there is no issue whatsoever (not even a סיבת האיסור). The קרן אורה agrees with this and explains that the גמרא earlier that said both איסורים come at the same time is going like the one who holds אין ב"ד מצווין להפרישו, but if you held ב"ד מצווין להפרישו then we would not view it as if the איסור suddenly came at bar mitzvah age but rather existed when he was a child as well.
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